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Abstract
Terrorists use violence in pursuit of political goals. While terror often has severe consequences for
victims, it remains an open question how terror attacks affect the general population. We study
the behavioral response of citizens of cities affected by 7 different terror attacks. We compare
real-time mobile communication patterns in the first 24 hours following a terror attack to the
corresponding patterns on days with no terror attack. On ordinary days, the group of female and
male participants have different activity patterns. Following a terror attack, however, we observe a
significant increase of the gender differences. Knowledge about citizens’ behavior response patterns
following terror attacks may have important implications for the public response during and after
an attack.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Terror attacks affect all parts of the world and are often carried out in attempts to com-
municate political messages or to dictate a political change [1, 2]. The European Parliament
and Council of the European Union defines an offence as terror if it has one of three aims;
the first of these is “seriously intimidating a population” [3]. While the direct consequences
of an attack are easily quantified in terms of human casualties or material damage, the impli-
cations for the populations more broadly remains an open question. Of particular interest is
how terror attacks impact the behavior of citizens. How do people react? Do people signif-
icantly change their behavior? If they do, is this change in behavior similar for all citizens,
or are particular groups of individuals especially susceptible? Knowledge on such questions
is sparse, yet valuable in making informed decisions about public response following terror
attacks.
Previous studies have shown that exposure to terror increases the level of psychological
stress as well as the frequency of disorders such as post traumatic stress, anxiety, and de-
pression. For example, in the month following the 9/11 attacks, 12% of the U.S. population
experienced significant distress, about 30% reported symptoms of anxiety and 27% reported
that they avoided situations that reminded them of 9/11 [4]. Exposure to terror through
media or from knowing a victim also results in higher levels of avoidance behavior, a sub-
jective feeling of insecurity, emotional distress, as well as changes of daily routines such as
the choice of transportation [5, 6]. Whereas repeated exposure is known to be a physical
health risk [7], studies have shown that for isolated events, the frequency of stress symptoms
quickly return to normal levels – for instance among citizens in New York City following
the 9/11 terror attacks [8]. Individual differences, and to some extent gender differences,
have been reported to be factors in the response to terror [9–13]. For example, in a survey
study women expressed symptoms of posttraumatic stress and depression more frequently
than men [14]. Women’s likelihood of developing posttraumatic stress symptoms were six
times higher than those for men. It has also been reported that continuous threat of a terror
attack promotes risk taking behaviors in men [13].
Objective real-time data have been used to analyze behavior patterns following e.g. nat-
ural disasters [15, 16], emergencies [17], and crowd disasters [17–19]. Whereas objective
data have been used in studies on the frequency and size of terror attacks [20, 21] and
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structural properties of operational networks [22, 23], systematic studies on the behavioral
impact of terror typically have relied on post-terror and self-report data. Consequently,
quantitative studies of terror-related behavioral changes are much needed [24]. In fact, the
use of objective data to understand peoples response is limited to a few studies, for example
in observations of correlations between the terror alert level and the number of people using
public transportation [25], in observations of an increase of fatal traffic accidents in the days
following a terror attack [26], and the behavioral response to a bombing with several injured
and no fatalities [17]. In the latter case, the authors found that females were more likely
to make a call following the emergency, than expected on normal days. Here, we analyze
behavior patterns in telecommunication following several recent terror attacks throughout
Europe. We rigorously test for gender differences in the behavioral response to terror attacks
and explicitly compare with ordinary days with no terror attacks.
II. RESULTS
Our study uses data on telecommunication activity following 7 terror attacks in 6 different
cities: Paris, Nice, Berlin, London(×2), Stockholm, and Barcelona. The attacks were carried
out in the period November 14, 2015 - August 17, 2017, and although the attacks varied in
size, all attacks resulted in several casualties (see Material and Methods).
Figure 1 shows that following a terror attack the activity deviates significantly from the
normal diurnal rhythm [27, 28] (see Supplementary Section SII). In our analysis, we focus on
the deviation in the 24 hour window following terror attacks. We calculate the cumulative
telecommunication activities for the female and male population separately, with notation
CF (t) and CM(t), where the subscripts F and M refer to females and males, respectively.
We normalize the cumulative activity such that for both populations, CF/M(0h) = 0 and
CF/M(24h) = 1. We compute the area ∆FM between the two curves, CF (t) and CM(t), and
use this area to quantify the difference in behavior change (See Methods for details on our
statistical analysis). Figure 2 shows an example of the activity on an ordinary day (panel A)
and on a day following a terror attack (panel C). The corresponding cumulative activities are
shown in panels B and D. Note that in Fig. 2A, the telecommunication activity of females
is higher. Averaging over all participants in our study, we find that females in general are
18% more active than the male participants (see Supplementary Section SII). However, the
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FIG. 1. Normalized communication activity at the day of the terror attack and the
three consecutive days. The activity of the genders are normalized separately by their respective
mean activities over 8 background weeks. The colored area under the curves shows the increased
activity relative to the background weeks.
normalized cumulative activity (Fig. 2B) shows that the only difference between the diurnal
rhythm of the genders is the volume of the activity. Following a terror attack, however, the
response of the female participants is significantly different to that of the males as illustrated
in Fig. 2D and quantified by the area between the normalized cumulative activities.
Following each terror attack, we probe the difference between the gender specific commu-
nication patterns by computing the area ∆FM . We compare this area with a null distribution
computed in the following way. First, we split the total population of both genders in two
groups chosen at random: one group, F˜ , which has a number of individuals equal to the
number of females in the original population and a group M˜ , consisting of the remaining
individuals. Note that these two groups will contain a mix of both genders. Second, we
compute an area ∆F˜ M˜ between the normalized cumulative activities of the two new groups
using the same 24 hour window following an attack. Repeating the process of randomly
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FIG. 2. Comparison of gender activities following an attack and in a representative
background week. A) Example of activities on normal days and C) activity following a terror
attack. For our analysis, we consider a Tmax = 24hrs window. B) To quantify behavior differences
between two groups of people, we use the area between normalized cumulative diurnal curves
of telecommunication. On normal days, our measure detects no difference in the relative gender
activities, however, D) following an attack, we see a pronounced difference marked by the area ∆αβ.
See Methods for technical details of how the measure can be computed from raw telecommunication
data.
splitting our population 105 times, we estimate the null distribution of ∆F˜ M˜ .
We now test if the communication patterns of the female and male participants are
significantly different on the day of the attack by computing the probability p to ob-
serve an equally or more extreme value than the empirically computed value ∆MF , i.e.
p =Prob(∆F˜ M˜ ≥ ∆FM). Figure 3 shows the null distribution and corresponding values of
p. Combining the measurements over all the cities (see Material and Methods) leaves that
the gender-specific patterns are different with a combined p value of less than 10−5.
Although the analysis above shows that the difference in behavior patterns is larger in the
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FIG. 3. Gender differences in telecommunication on days of terror attacks. Empirically
observed gender difference in telecommunication following terror attacks (black circles) plotted
relative to computed null distributions (violin plot) for all cities. The null-distributions were
computed by randomly shuffling individuals between our two gender groups and measuring the
difference in behavior of the new groups. Note that the true empirical values of the gender difference
all lie beyond the 0.75 percentile of the null-distribution.
gender specific group than in randomly sampled groups, we cannot yet rule out that such a
difference could be observed on ordinary days too. We therefore perform an additional test
where we compare the behavior difference on the day of attack with the difference in the
background weeks. Again, we quantify the behavior change by comparing ∆MF to a null
distribution of ∆M˜F˜ . Instead of shuffling gender labels (within the day of the attack), we
now randomly choose a recorded activity of the individuals from the 8 background weeks.
Like above, we keep the sizes of the populations fixed, i.e. |M | = |M˜ | and |F | = |F˜ |.
We now compute a null distribution by replacing the 24 hour communication pattern of
individuals with a randomly selected communication log (from a person of same gender) in
one of the 8 background weeks. In this way, we keep the gender fixed, but the activity on
the day of the terror is replaced by one from the background weeks. We finally quantify the
difference in communication behavior by the area between the normalized cumulative diurnal
telecommunication curves. We repeat this procedure 105 times to get a null distribution of
differences between males and females communication activity on ordinary days.
We can now test if the differences between female and male communication patterns
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FIG. 4. Amplified gender differences in behavior following terror attacks. Empirically
observed gender difference in telecommunication following terror attacks (black circles) plotted rel-
ative to computed null-distributions (violin plot) for all cities. The null-distributions were created
by computing the difference in telecommunication between groups of randomly selected males and
randomly selected females on days with no terror. The random population of males (females)
consisted of telecommunication logs drawn uniformly-at-random from the activity of all males (fe-
males) during the 8 background weeks. Note that the true empirical values of the gender difference
all lie beyond the median of the null-distribution. The probability of getting a set of empirical
values this or more extreme on days with no terror is approximately two in a thousand.
are more extreme on the day of the attack compared to ordinary days. To this end we
compute the probability to observe an equally or more extreme value than the empirical
∆MF . Figure 4 shows our results. We find that, for all cities, this probability is smaller than
50%. Combining these probabilities yields a chance of getting a set of probabilities at least
as extreme as these equal to p ≈ 0.002.
III. DISCUSSION
Terror attacks take place around the world and it is important to understand how the
general population reacts. Using real-time GPS and telecommunication data from 17, 000
people, we systematically studied behavior following 7 different terror attacks in Western
European countries. In particular, we studied the behavioral change of the groups of females
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and males in each city on the day of the attack as compared to ordinary days. We found
that the telecommunication of both males and females spiked following all terror attacks.
These spikes were significant deviations from normal telecommunication behavior.
One might expect that a sizable disturbance of a population, such as a terror attack,
might cause the distribution of calls of females and males to become more similar than they
would be otherwise. Juxtaposing the behavior of the two genders following terror attacks,
we found significant differences in the behavioral change of the two genders compared to
a group where gender labels are assigned randomly. The differences between the groups
of males and females after the attacks, were large even when correcting for differences on
ordinary background days.
It is an open question what causes the observed gender differences in behavior following
terror attacks. From a psychological perspective, differences in personality characteristics
for males and females could be relevant. Previously reported differences between women and
men in personality characteristics include scores in Emotionality and Honesty-Humility (for
a recent meta-analysis, see for example [29]). In this light, it would be interesting to test
whether the gender differences we observe can be attributed more directly to personality
traits known to differ between genders. It is important to qualify the point that these
results were obtained for the aggregated behavior of females and males. The uncovered
gender differences on the aggregate level do not imply that every female and every male act
significantly different from each other. The aggregated communication could be influenced
by “extreme” individuals. If this is the case, such extremes seem to be present systematically
in the different cities. Furthermore, systematic studies of the variance in behavior patterns
inside each group would be worthwhile to conduct.
Finally, future research should examine whether there are any cultural or regional dif-
ferences in the behavioral response to terror attacks. In our analysis, we found significant
gender differences in behavioral change following terror attacks supported by the analysis
presented in Figure 4. This figure also shows that although the difference in behavioral
change is generally large, the empirical values for the two London attacks lie almost exactly
at the null-distribution median. This begs the question whether London is different or if
this is just random coincidence. If London is different, is this difference rooted in history,
culture, geography, the nature of the attacks or some other variable? Knowledge on how
terror attacks impact the general population is important in formulating a public response
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City Time of attack No. Fatalities/No. Injured No. People in data
Paris (FR) 00:58, November 14, 2015 137/368 [30] 2523
Nice (FR) 10:30 pm, July 14 2016 86/201 [31] 237
Berlin (DE) 8:02 pm, December 19 2016 12/56 [31] 2295
London (UK) 2:40 pm, March 22 2017 6/50 [32] 5415
Stockholm (SE) 2:53 pm, April 7, 2017 5/14 [32] 741
London (UK) 10:06 pm, June 3 2017 11/48 [32] 5131
Barcelona (ES) 4:54 pm, August 17 2017 15/131 [32] 688
TABLE I. Details about the terror attacks included in the study and the data concern-
ing each attack.
to such offenses, and we hope in this regard that our study will inspire further work on this
topic.
IV. METHODS
A. Experimental design
We analyse behavioral change following 7 terror attacks carried out in different European
countries. Details of the different attacks are listed in Table I including city name, time of
the attack, the number of casualties and injured, and the number of people included in our
data set. We monitor the behavior difference using telecommunication data on the week of
the attack and compare it with 8 background weeks leading up to the terror attacks. For
each background week, we consider the same 24-hour interval as we do following a terror
attack. The 8 weeks used as background for each attack are listed in Table II.
B. Data description
We used a dataset of phone-app usage and GPS records collected by a global mobile
phone and electronic company between 2015 and 2017. We considered 7 terror attacks, and
selected ∼ 17, 000 users who lived in the same city where an attack occurred at the time it
happened. Specifically, we selected users whose most visited location in the period under
9
City First background week Monday Last background week Sunday
Paris (FR) September 14, 2015 November 22, 2015
Nice (FR) May 19, 2016 July 17, 2016
Berlin (DE) October 24, 2016 December 18, 2016
London (UK) January 25, 2017 March 21, 2017
Stockholm (SE) February 10, 2017 April 6, 2017
London (UK) April 7, 2017 June 2, 2017
Barcelona (ES) June 22, 2017 August 16, 2017
TABLE II. Details about background weeks used in the analysis.
study (see Table II) is within a bounding box around the city where the attack happened (see
Supplementary Table S1). We considered the usage of applications the company categorized
as “Communication”. About 60% of events in this category concern the usage of 5 Android
apps: Phone, Messaging, WhatsApp Messenger, Facebook, Gmail and Facebook Messenger.
Users are aged between 18 and 80 years old, with an average age of 36 years. About 42%
of the users are female. Written consent in electronic form has been obtained for all study
participants.
C. Statistical methods
1. Measure from telecommunication data
In the following we formally define the measure – the area between normalized cumulative
diurnal curves of telecommunication – we are use in our analyses. In a given time interval,
[0, tmax], individual participants, γ, initiate Nγ communication events at times {ti,γ}Nγi=1. We
define the activity function A(γ)(t) of an individual in terms of the point process
A(γ)(t) =
Nγ∑
i=1
δ(t− ti,γ), (1)
where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function. The activity function of a population X is the sum
of individual activity functions,
AX(t) =
∑
γ∈X
A(γ)(t). (2)
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For each population activity function AX(t), we define the corresponding normalized cumu-
lative activity function
CX(t) =
∫ t
0
AX(t
′)dt′∫ tmax
0
AX(t′)dt′
. (3)
where the denominator is the total number of initiated communication events in our popula-
tion, NX =
∑
γ∈X Nγ, and thus CX(t) is equal to the fraction of communication events that
were initiated before the time t. To assess the differences in communication patterns for two
populations X and Y in a time interval [0, tmax], we compare how communication events
are distributed over the time interval for the two populations. Specifically, we calculate the
area between the cumulative activity functions for the two populations,
∆XY =
∫ tmax
0
|CX(t)− CY (t)| dt. (4)
In this study, the length of the time interval, tmax, is fixed to be 24 hours. On a normal day,
females, in our population, are on average 18% more active than males. Fig. 2A illustrates
this; similar curves are shown for the all cities included in this study in Supplementary Figure
1. The measure, defined in Eq. (4), has a number of attractive features. It is not sensitive to
the imbalance in gender activities and allows us to quantify changes to the diurnal rhythm.
Moreover, our measure does not require any artificial binning of data and is not particularly
sensitive to the chosen time interval.
Combining the results to probe for gender differences. In our analysis, we obtain probabil-
ities for the random occurrence of gender differences of the same size as observed following
the terror attacks. If the null hypothesis, that there are no enhanced gender differences,
were true, these probabilities would be uniformly sampled on the interval [0, 1]. We test this
as follows. If X1, X2, . . . , Xn are stochastic variables drawn from a uniform distribution, the
random variables
Yi = −2 ln(Xi), (5)
are independent and identically distributed according to the chi-square distribution with 2
degrees of freedom. The sum of these variables
T =
n∑
i=1
Yi, (6)
is distributed according to the chi-square distribution with 2n degrees of freedom. To test
whether our obtained probabilities support the hypothesis that the gender differences are
11
Barcelona Berlin London1 London2 Nice Paris Stockholm
Fig 3 0.01312 0.02543 0.10505 0.06394 0.10809 0.03104 0.00233
Fig 4 0.00862 0.06071 0.44336 0.45604 0.07581 0.15288 0.21411
TABLE III. Fraction of null distributions more or equally extreme as empirical values
in Figs. 3 and 4. The fraction of null distributions depicted in Figs. 3 and 4 that lie beyond the
corresponding empirically observed values. We subtract each of these values from 1 and plug them
into Eq. (5) and then (6) to calculate a combined probability using Eq. (7).
not larger than should be expected from ordinary days, we calculate this T value using
Equations (5) and (6). We then calculate the area under the chi-square distribution with
2n degrees of freedom, at values larger than T ,
pcombined =
∫ ∞
T
χ22n(x)dx. (7)
This integral is equal to the chance of getting the set of probabilities if X1, X2, . . . , Xn were
drawn from a uniform distribution.
2. p-values used in calculating probability of observing behavior differences randomly
The distributions depicted in Figures 4 and 3 give us two sets of p-values. In each case, we
used the method described above to estimate the probability that the empirically observed
measure values would be obtained if the values were results of statistical fluctuations. The
p-values are shown in Tab. III. Combining these p-values give the combined probabilities
listed in the main text.
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city min lat max lat min lon max lon
Berlin 52.369276 52.650018 13.091432 13.754525
Nice 43.646275 43.758400 7.178630 7.338724
Barcelona 41.310933 41.465339 2.058793 2.244023
London 51.325628 51.672014 -0.472381 0.268712
Stockholm 59.298186 59.371545 17.945337 18.154841
Copenhagen 55.5531 55.8175 12.2607 12.7043
Paris 48.7106 48.9991 2.0641 2.6463
TABLE S1. Bounding boxes used to select individuals living in the cities under study. The table
reports the minimum and maximum values of the latitude and longitude.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
SI. GEOGRAPHY OF THE CITIES UNDER STUDY.
We selected individuals whose most visited locations during the period under study (see
Table II) is located within the city where the attack happened. The bounding boxes char-
acterizing each city are described in Table S1.
SII. DIURNAL COMMUNICATION ON ORDINARY DAYS
The populations of males and females show distinct diurnal communication patterns in all
of the cities we include in our analysis. Fig S1 shows these curves for all background weeks
used in our study. The curves are almost identical for all background weeks, indicating that
averaging over the weeks yields a good estimate of the diurnal activity. Females communicate
on average 18% more than males but normalizing their activity yield indistinguishable curves.
These normalized curves are shown in Fig. 1 of the main text.
SIII. SIGNIFICANCE OF PEAKS FOLLOWING TERROR ATTACKS
Figure 1 shows that a terror attack is followed by a spike in telecommunication activity
for both genders for all cities in our study. In order to assess the significance of the spikes in
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FIG. S1. Illustration of diurnal communication patterns during ordinary days. Data for all back-
ground week are plotted in dashed lines. The mean activity for each gender is plotted with full
lines. On average, females communicate 18% more than men.
the communication, we compare with a null model in the following way. We first compute
a null-distribution of the area between normalized cumulative diurnal telecommunication
curves by bootstrapping. The null-distribution quantifies natural variation to the diurnal
pattern. More specifically, in a population of for example n males, we create a set of
individual activities on ordinary days {A(p)}p∈M where M is the subset of males in our
population and each element is a 24 hour sequence of communication events, see Eq. (2).
This set has 8n elements, one for each person and for each of the 8 background weeks. We
draw n random elements from {A(p)}p∈M (allowing for repeated draws of the same element)
corresponding to n activity functions, from which we get a single background cumulative
activity function using Eqs. (2) and (3). We then choose one of the 8 ordinary days, i, and
calculate the area between the cumulative activity functions for the male population at day
i, and the cumulative activity function for the n randomly picked individuals. By repeating
this procedure 105 times for each background week i, we obtain 8 null distributions of areas.
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City Gender Combined
Nice Male 2.91 · 10−19
London2 Female 1.88 · 10−5
London2 Male 7.59 · 10−6
London1 Female 7.08 · 10−20
London1 Male 1.07 · 10−36
TABLE S2. Combined p-values for peaks following terror attacks (peaks illustrated in Fig. 1). All
combinations of attack and gender that are not listed had p-values indistinguishable from 0.
Then, we test the alternatives (a) and (b), by computing the probability to observe
the empirical communication activity measured on the day of the attack during any of
the background weeks. We obtain these empirical values by calculating the area between
the cumulative activity function of the male population on the day of the attack, and the
cumulative activity function of the male population on each of the ordinary days. The
percentage of the measure-value null distribution of week i that is larger than or equal
to the empirical value for week i represents the probability that the empirical value is
a result of random noise. These 8 probabilities can be combined into a single p-value,
expressing the likelihood of getting the 8 probabilities given that the telecommunication
was unaffected compared to ordinary days (see Methods). For all cities and both genders,
we find that the probability associated to alternative (a) is less than 1.88 · 10−5, revealing
that the telecommunication observed in the 24 hours following the terror attacks is unlikely
to be observed on ordinary days (see Table S2).
The least significant peak is the one exhibited by females after the second London attack.
For this population, we obtained the p-values 0.99988, 0.8216, 0.89666, 0.9994, and 0.99502.
Combining these in the way described in Methods yields the single p-value 1.88 ·10−5. Other
than this population, only 4 populations did not have every p-value smaller than 10−5. The
combined p-values for these are all below 10−5 (best estimate is listed in Table S2).
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